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Financial compliance in the European Union: A cross-national assessment of financial 
correction patterns and causes in Cohesion policy. 
 
Abstract. EU compliance scholarship has expanded rapidly over the last decade but has 
ŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ
with EU financial rules on the regularity and legality of EU spending. This article makes the 
case for a multi-dimensional approach to compliance research and provides a cross-national 
assessment of financial compliance in EU Cohesion policy, employing quantitative and 
qualitative methods. To account for cross-national variations in the application of financial 
corrections for non-compliant spending, several factors are explored, focusing on regional 
autonomy, administrative capacity and goodness-of-fit. The quantitative analysis finds 
strong support for the impact of administrative capacity on cross-national compliance 
patterns and some evidence for the role of goodness-of-fit. Contrary to expectations, 
regional autonomy is not associated with compliance in this critical case of EU multi-level 
governance. Qualitative analysis reinforces these findings and reveals additional factors of 
relevance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past two decades, financial compliance has increasingly become a salient priority 
for EU policy-makers. In November 2015, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) annual 
report on the EU accounts issued a negative statement of assurance  W as it has done every 
year since 1995 when such statements were first issued - on the legality and regularity of 
ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ  “ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůůǇ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ďǇĞƌƌŽƌ ?  ?  ? ? ?5). The 
persistently high level of irregularities in EU spending affects the reputation of the European 
Commission and its relations with the European Parliament; and it has been cited in 
European Council debates on the EU budget to justify reductions in expenditure and 
prompted criticism of the implementation of policies such as the CAP and Cohesion policy.  
The problems with financial compliance go to the heart of the relationship between the EU 
and Member States, and the balance between Commission oversight and national 
implementation of ƚŚĞ h ďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ŶŽƚĂďůǇ ƵŶĚĞƌ ďƵĚŐĞƚ ŚĞĂĚŝŶŐƐ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ  ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
 
Consequently, since the early 2000s and particularly over the 2007-13 period, EU regulatory 
frameworks for financial management, control and fraud prevention have been 
progressively strengthened. The investigative and coordinative capabilities of the 
Commission have been enhanced, and Member States have been subject to greater 
accountability for their financial management and more coercive measures in the form of 
payment interruptions, suspensions and corrections (Mendez and Bachtler 2011; Porras-
Gómez 2013). 
 
EU compliance scholarship has mushroomed during the last decade (Mastenbroek 2005; 
Toshkov 2010; Angelova et al. 2012). However, the financial dimension has been overlooked 
in these studies, which focus mainly on the legislative transposition of EU Directives across a 
range of regulatory policies. This may reflect the popularity of a regulatory conception of the 
h ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽǁŶƉůĂǇƐƚŚĞh ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶďƵĚŐĞƚĂƌǇƉŽůŝĐŝes. Yet, the EU budget is substantial in 
some policy areas ?ƉůĂǇƐĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŽůĞŝŶĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?ƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ, and 
provides the political and financial underpinning for economic and monetary union, the 
single market, the Europe 2020 strategy and EU enlargements. Further, measures of 
financial regularity provide quantifiable and internationally comparable data on non-
compliance during implementation. This has the potential to take compliance research 
beyond transposition and open up ƚŚĞ ‘ďůĂĐŬďŽǆ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨhůĂǁ ?,ŽďŽůƚŚĂŶĚ
Martinson 2013), testing whether the cross-national compliance patterns and determinants 
in studies of EU Directives remain valid at the implementation stage. 
 
Against this background, the aims of this article are two-fold. First, it makes the case for a 
multi-dimensional understanding of EU compliance by going beyond the legislative and legal 
dimensions (transposition or infringement proceedings) and introducing a financial 
dimension (the regularity and legality of EU expenditure). Second, it undertakes an empirical 
assessment of financial compliance patterns and determinants, using EU Cohesion policy as 
a case study, to establish whether and how the financial dimension of compliance differs 
from the legislative and legal dimensions.  
 
EU Cohesion policy, implemented in all 28 Member States through Structural and 
Investment (Cohesion) Funds, is a relevant domain for investigating financial compliance 
given that it accounts for a third of the EU budget witŚĂŶĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?-
13.  It suffers from a major compliance  ‘problem ? reflected in the consistently higher level of 
 ‘ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?  ?ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƌƵůĞƐ ? ƚŚĂŶ ŝŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂƌĞĂƐ ŽĨ h ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ
(Mendez and Bachtler 2011; ECA 2015). 
 Cohesion policy has a unique multi-level governance model of implementation 
encompassing EU, national and sub-national actors (Hooghe and Marks 2001). By contrast, 
subnational competences in the transposition of EU Directives are often secondary to the 
role of national governments (Falkner et al. 2007; Borghetto & Franchino 2010). If 
subnational autonomy matters in explaining non-compliance with EU Directives (Angelova et 
al. 2012; Borghetto and Franchino 2010; Toshkov 2010), it should matter even more in this 
paradigm case of multi-level governance.  
 
Lastly, despite the increasing scholarly interest in compliance issues in Cohesion policy 
(Davies and Polverari 2011; Levy et al. 2011; Mendez and Bachtler 2011), there has been no 
theory-driven research of the cross-national variations and causes in this field.  Does non-
compliance in EU Cohesion policy vary across countries? If so, what are the underlying 
determinants? Drawing on cross-national data and employing qualitative and quantitative 
methods, this article explores the importance of financial compliance and provides the first 
comparative assessment of financial compliance patterns and determinants in EU Cohesion 
policy.  
 
The next section develops hypotheses for investigating compliance performance in Cohesion 
policy, drawing on the compliance literature. The methodology is then presented, followed 
by an overview of the financial compliance regime.  The empirical analysis maps out cross-
national differences in financial compliance using a quantitative indicator (the rate of 
corrections associated with irregularities) and tests the explanatory power of three factors:  
regional autonomy; administrative capacity; and goodness-of-fit. The findings differ from the 
conclusions of transposition research, both in terms of compliance patterns and the 
influence of political decentralisation.   Wider implications are presented in the conclusions. 
 COMPLIANCE THEORY AND EXPECTATIONS FOR COHESION POLICY  
 
The academic literature on EU compliance has expanded greatly recently (for surveys, see 
Mastenbroek 2005; Toshkov 2010; Angelova et al. 2012), advancing our understanding of 
compliance and policy implementation, building bridges between qualitative and 
quantitative traditions in EU Studies and stimulating lively scholarly debates (Falkner 2007; 
Falkner et al. 2007; Thomson 2007; 2009; Toshkov 2007a; 2007b; Mbaye 2009; 2010; 2013). 
However, there are limits to the general applicability of the findings (Angelova et al. 2012; 
Toshkov 2010). The focus on Directives has diverted attention from compliance with 
Regulations, the more prevalent and directly enforceable legal instrument of the EU. Other 
well-known biases include the focus on legislative (transposition) processes or legal 
enforcement (infringement) proceedings - rather than implementation outcomes - in two EU 
policy areas (mostly social and environmental policies).   
 
A less-recognised limitation is the narrow conceptualisation of compliance implicit in existing 
studies, which have excluded financial compliance with EU rules on the regularity and 
legality of expenditure. Nevertheless, the literature provides relevant insights and testable 
hypotheses for investigating financial compliance. A range of EU, domestic and policy-
specific factors has been identified to account for variations in compliance (reviewed in 
detail in Toshkov 2007; Angelova et al. 2012). Drawing on this research, three main factors 
are empirically relevant to Cohesion policy.  
 
Regional autonomy. Territorial governance arrangements can play a fundamental role in 
shaping compliance outcomes by determining the number and power of veto points in the 
policy process (Haverland, 1999; Steunenberg, 2006; König and Luetgert, 2009; Mbaye 
2009). In political systems that grant subnational/regional governments greater autonomy 
(e.g. decentralised or federal political systems compared to centralised systems), there is a 
greater opportunity for regional governments to block compliance, while more centralised 
systems may be able to enforce compliance centrally. The negative relationship between 
regionalism/federalism and compliance ŝƐ  “ǁĞůů ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ?in quantitative studies of EU 
compliance (reviewed in Toshkov 2010) and is supported in qualitative case study research 
(e.g. Bursens 2002).  
 
Going beyond general measures of regional autonomy at the level of the polity, it is 
appropriate also to consider policy-specific measures of autonomous subnational decision-
making capacity. In the case of Cohesion policy, a distinction can be made between national 
and regional programmes, the latter granting greater decision-making autonomy for 
subnational actors tailored to regional contexts and interests. Following the same logic as 
regionalisation/federalism arguments in compliance studies, the implementation of regional 
programmes can provide opportunities for subnational actors to subvert or veto EU and 
national rules; and central oversight, coordination or enforcement may be more challenging 
in regional programmes compared to national programmes managed centrally. These 
considerations inform two hypotheses about the impact of regional autonomy and 
programming on non-compliance: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Non-compliance increases with the level of regional autonomy in 
the political system. 
Hypothesis 1b: Non-compliance increases with the level of programme 
regionalisation in Cohesion policy funding. 
 
Theoretically, the impact of regional autonomy on Cohesion policy implementation can also 
be positive (Tosun 2014). Political decentralisation could facilitate effective implementation 
if it promotes more accountability in policy delivery and may support financial compliance 
(Polverari 2015).  DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐ ŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐŵƵůƚŝůĞǀel 
governance model of decentralised delivery and its partnership principle is that tailoring the 
policy to regional/local preferences and conditions supports effective implementation by 
eliciting local knowledge and increasing ownership (Barca 2009). These accountability 
considerations inform alternative hypotheses to the previous two by positing a negative 
relationship between non-compliance and regional autonomy and programming: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Non-compliance decreases with the level of regional autonomy. 
Hypothesis 2b: Non-compliance decreases with the level of programme 
regionalisation in Cohesion policy funding. 
 
Administrative capacity. Managerial approaches stress the role of administrative capacity in 
explaining compliance outcomes (Berglund et al. 2006; Falkner et al., 2005; Hille and Knill, 
2006; Mbaye, 2001; Knill 1998). The theoretical reasoning is that smaller or ineffective 
bureaucracies lack the resources or capability to comply, to provide the information 
necessary to reduce compliance uncertainty or to coordinate and enforce compliance. A 
ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ĨŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞŽŶůǇ ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ
support in most quantitative anaůǇƐĞƐƐŽĨĂƌŝƐǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?
(Trieb 2008). Recent studies confirm the positive effect of administrative effectiveness on 
transposition timing (Toshkov 2010; Konig and Mader 2014), although a comprehensive 
meta-analysis reported mixed results and called for more empirical research (Angelova et al. 
2012). 
 
While the role of administrative capacity in Cohesion policy has received increased attention 
in recent years (European Commission 2014a), studies have examined the impact of capacity 
on economic performance (Becker et al. 2011; Rodriguez-Pose and Garcilazo 2013) and 
financial absorption (Tosun 2014) rather than compliance. Nor has the financial dimension 
of compliance been the primary focus of qualitative case studies of administrative 
implementation on a sub-set of regions (Milio 2007) or EU10 countries (Bachtler et al. 2013). 
Nevertheless, these studies do find a positive link between capacity and implementation 
performance. The importance of capacity for effective implementation is echoed in 
Cohesion policy evaluations (Bachtler et al. 2009) and is reflected in the 2013 reform of the 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĂŶĞǁƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌ ‘ĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƵŶŝƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
Commission to support capacity-building. The third hypothesis therefore is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Non-compliance increases with the ineffectiveness of Member 
^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ 
 
Goodness-of-fit. KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨhĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚŶĞƐƐ-
of-Ĩŝƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶhĂŶĚdomestic policies and goals (Haverland 2000), the expectation being 
that non-ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ  ‘ŵŝƐĨŝƚ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ status quo 
and EU policies or goals (e.g. Heritier 1996). Many quantitative and qualitative studies have 
confirmed the positive effect on compliance performance of goodness-of-fit, measured with 
a range of variables including fit with national policies, legacies, structures and financial 
consequences (reviewed in Angelova et al. 2012).   
 
A pertinent indicator of goodness-of-fit in EU Cohesion policy is the proportion of EU versus 
domestic funding for economic development. In countries where Cohesion policy funding 
accounts for a major share of public investment, there is less scope to fund purely domestic 
policies, and EU frameworks/rules exert a powerful influence on the design of domestic 
regional development strategies, instruments and rules (EPRC & EUROREG 2010). 
Conversely, in more-developed countries with relatively small EU financial allocations, there 
may be less alignment between EU rules and established domestic rules for national regional 
policies, requiring managing authorities and beneficiaries to undertake dual compliance for 
projects (Davies and Polverari 2011). Formulated as a hypothesis: 
 
x Hypothesis 4: Non-compliance increases with the scale of domestic expenditure 
for development relative to Cohesion policy expenditure.  
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Employing a mixed methods approach, this study uses quantitative and qualitative data to 
examine the extent and causes of financial compliance in EU Cohesion policy across the 
EU25 Member States. The focus is on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
because it accounts for the majority of Cohesion policy expenditure and operates on a more 
decentralised basis than the other Social and Cohesion Funds within the remit of Cohesion 
policy, a necessary condition for assessing the impact of regional autonomy on compliance.  
 
As Mbaye (2009) notes, the measurement of compliance is inherently difficult. Hence, for 
the dependent variable a measure of financial non-compliance is used in the form of data on 
financial corrections. These measure the amount of EU funding withdrawn from 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?- ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ h ĂƐ  ‘ĂŶǇ ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă
provision of EU law which has, or would have, the effect of prejudicing the general budget of 
ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶďǇĐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐĂŶƵŶũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ŝƚĞŵŽĨĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƚŽƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůďƵĚŐĞƚ ?
(article 1.7 of Regulation 1083/2006).  This is a quantified and comparable measure of non-
compliance at the implementation stage. By contrast, most studies of Directives examine 
indirect measures of the timing of transposition into national law with varying assumptions 
about the length of delay that constitutes non-compliance and ignoring implementation 
outcomes (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009; Toshkov 2010). Further, financial corrections are 
implemented in response to audits and checks by EU and national audit/control bodies and 
should be based on representative samples of projects and assessments of management and 
control systems. These provide some confidence in the reliability of the measure, 
notwithstanding some differences in the methodologies used (ECA 2013) and, importantly, 
potential bias due to differences in the audit practices of Member States (Cipriani 2010; NAO 
2010; Nyikos and Talaga 2014). 
 
As there are wide variations in the application of financial corrections for non-compliance in 
any given year, it is necessary to examine compliance over an extended timescale. The 2000-
06 period has been selected because it has been subject to a full cycle of compliance 
assessment, based on final payments of allocations and the conclusion of financial 
corrections procedures at the closure of accounts for programmes in 2013. By contrast, the 
2007-13 programmes have until 2015 to spend their allocations and several more years until 
formal closure.  
 
Turning to the explanatory variables, regional autonomy is measured using the Regional 
Authority Index (Hooghe et al. 2008), capturing the authority exercised by regions across 
four aggregated dimensions (institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy and 
representation). An additional policy-specific indicator used is the regionalization of ERDF 
expenditure (the share of the ERDF managed through regional programmes as opposed to 
national programmes), drawn from European Commission data on programming available 
online via the inforegio website.  To measure administrative capacitǇ ? ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ?Ɛ
ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ŝŶĚĞǆ ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ‘ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ƐŽƵŶĚ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ? For the administrative capacity and 
regional autonomy variables the data are for 2006, on the basis that it is the final year of the 
2000-06 period for committing funding to projects (see also Tosun 2014).  Goodness-of-fit is 
measured by calculating the share of ERDF funding relative to national expenditure for 
economic development as an average over the eligibility period (2000-6 for the EU15 and 
2004-6 for the EU12), drawn from official data on ERDF allocations on the Commission (DG 
Regio) website and Eurostat data on expenditure for economic development (ISMERI & 
APPLICA 2010).  
 
The qualitative component of the methodology involved content analysis of EU 
documentary evidence relating to Cohesion policy compliance. This comprised systematic 
scrutiny of 20 financial management documents relevant to the 2000-06 period for evidence 
relating to the hypotheses and alternative explanations of compliance. The documents 
covered in the analysis were: ƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐAnnual Activity Reports from 2002 to 2012, 
which review Commission audit/control activities in all Member States and provide the main 
internal accountability mechanism for granting assurance within the Commission (for 
example, European Commission 2012); and the  ?Ɛreports on the EU budget, also from 
2002 to 2012, based on the audits of a sample of Member State systems and projects and 
providing the main source of information for the Parliament to approve the EU budget 
during the annual discharge procedure.  /ŶĞĂĐŚĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ ?ĨŽƌĞĂĐŚǇĞĂƌ ?Ɛ
reports), the key risks or types of error identified, the effectiveness of authorities/systems, 
and the actions taken or recommendations made. 
 
Subsequently, eight in-depth interviews were conducted with senior officials in Commission 
audit services and managing authorities in six Member States to validate and explain the 
findings (with a guarantee of complete anonymity in reporting the responses, including of 
the countries, to ensure reliable responses). The semi-structured interviews were carried 
out by the authors in 2014 and 2015 and focused first on explaining the findings of the 
quantitative analysis with previous compliance research and then exploring other 
explanations for financial compliance across the Member States.  
 
FINANCIAL COMPLIANCE IN EU COHESION POLICY  
Managing compliance in the Member States 
dŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU requires 
Member States to ensure that implementation of the budget accords with the principles of 
sound financial management (Article 317). These provisions are fleshed out in more detail in 
ƚŚĞh ?Ɛ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞƚŽĂůůhĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƐĞĐƚŽƌ-specific rules for 
different policies (European Commission 2013a). In Cohesion policy, these rules are specified 
in a General Regulation (Regulation 1303/2013) and pertain mainly to the adequacy of 
management and control systems and the eligibility and accuracy of expenditure, including 
conformity with cross-cutting EU laws, such as public procurement and competition policy 
rules, and certain national eligibility rules. 
 
Under the shared management principle, the European Commission and Member States are 
jointly accountable for the use of EU Cohesion policy according to the Eh ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƌƵůĞƐ 
(Bachtler et al 2013). While Cohesion policy is delivered through multi-annual programmes 
designed in partnership between the Commission, Member States and sub-national 
authorities, implementation and compliance are primarily the responsibility of Member 
State authorities.  However, the Commission is ultimately responsible for the EU budget and 
ŝƐ ŚĞůĚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ďǇ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ďƵĚŐĞƚĂƌǇĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ in the European 
Parliament and ECA under the budgetary discharge procedure (Mendez and Bachtler 2011; 
Davies and Polverari 2011). 
 
The Commission builds its assurance over each seven-year programme period (European 
Commission 2009; European Commission 2014b; 2015).  It begins with Commission approval 
of Member State management and control systems at the start of a period and involves 
regular audits and checks of systems and payments during the implementation period and 
following its closure. Member States are required to ensure sound financial management 
through effective (error-free) management, audit and control systems through a trio of 
institutions  W managing, certifying and audit authorities - with functions specified by EU 
rules. In the first instance, national and regional Managing Authorities have the primary 
responsibility for ensuring compliance and carrying out first-level controls on applications 
for funding from beneficiary organisations. Institutionally separate Certifying Authorities are 
required to scrutinize the functioning of the Managing Authorities and to check payments 
made to beneficiaries before declaring  ‘Đertified expenditure ? to the Commission. 
Independent national or regional Audit Authorities perform audits of systems and projects 
and report the results to the Commission, and the whole system is periodically assessed by 
the ECA.   
 
Payments to the Member States by the Commission are made by way of reimbursements of 
declared expenditure statements several times a year. If EU institutions or Member States 
detect infringements of EU rules (irregularities), financial corrections are made to the 
statements by subtracting the non-compliant funding. Irregularities range from minor 
infringements of administrative procedures (e.g. rules on retention of paperwork or publicity 
requirements) and small overpayments to projects, to non
procurement rules in the award of contracts and ultimately fraud. Financial corrections do 
not necessarily result in a loss of funds to Member States because the withdrawn money can 
be reused to fund other projects during the eligible period. A net loss of funds only occurs 
when the Member State chooses not to withdraw ineligible expenditure or when corrections 
are made during programme closure by which stage replacement projects cannot be co-
funded by the EU. 
 
Compliance performance  ? cross-national patterns of financial corrections 
Cross-national differences in the rate of corrections are illustrated in Table 1 drawing on 
European Commission data (European Commission 2013b).   For the EU25 as a whole, the 
financial corrections on spending under the 2000-06 ERDF programmes were calculated to 
be 5.6% of total expenditure  ? ? ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ ?ĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ ? ? ? ?. The highest correction rates 
were in Ireland, Greece and Spain.  At the other end of the spectrum, the five countries with 
the lowest corrections rates are Cyprus, Finland, Latvia, Hungary and Sweden. Surprisingly, 
these top-five compliance performers include three new Member States (Cyprus, Hungary 
and Latvia) with far less experience in managing Cohesion policy. Indeed, there are six  ‘new ? 
Member States among the top-10 performers, and only three  ‘new ? Member States in the 
bottom 10 ranked countries. On average, financial corrections were significantly lower in the 
EU10 (2.2%) than the EU15 (5.9%).  Part of the gap is explained by the high level of 
corrections in Italy, Greece and Spain, although even excluding these countries still gives an 
EU15 error rate of 3.5%, significantly above that of the EU10. 
 
The differences between the EU15 and EU10 are apparently not attributable to the relative 
brevity of the programme period for the EU10 (five years, compared to eight years for the 
EU15); or the comparatively small scale of EU funding in the initial years following accession, 
albeit a much greater scale of funding than the EU15 allocations in proportion to domestic 
economic development expenditure (ISMERI & APPLICA 2010). Preliminary data for the 
2007-13 period indicate that the financial corrections rate in the EU10 may again be less 
than half that for the EU15 during a period when the EU10 accounted for almost half of 
Cohesion policy funding (European Commission 2014b). The preliminary 2007-13 figures 
show much less variation among the EU15 group; the error rate for Ireland is again much 
higher than all other countries, but the rates for Greece and Spain are close to the EU15 
average. 
 
The existing literature points to two plausible explanations for the strong compliance 
performance of the EU10 in Cohesion policy (Bachtler et al. 2014). First, there was an 
intensive pre-accession aid programme to build Cohesion policy management capacities, 
especially with respect to financial management and control, in the new member states. 
Second, there was a stronger financial incentive for the new member states to comply in 
order to avoid providing net payer countries with reasons for cutting the overall Cohesion 
policy budget or reducing the relative share for new member states during the post-2006 EU 
budget negotiations. 
 
 
[Table 1] 
 
Compliance performance  ? system and project audits 
Further insights on financial compliance by the Member States are provided by the separate 
meta-analysis of EU audit reports. These audits involve examining samples of projects and 
control systems and the identification of error, from which extrapolated percentages of non-
compliant expenditure are produced. The results of the meta-analysis are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4. 
 The Commission audits of systems found serious compliance weaknesses across Member 
States throughout the period. In the first three years of audit carried out in 2006-8 while 
payments were still being made for commitments made  during the 2000-06 period, only a 
minority of the systems were assessed as working well, while most needed improvements or 
significant improvements to provide reasonable assurance.1  In the later retrospective 
system audits carried out in (2009-12), there was evidence of rapid improvement; most 
programmes were assessed as providing reasonable assurance, but with Ă  ‘ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞ ? Žƌ
 ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ?ůĞǀĞůŽĨƌŝƐŬ of errors.  
 
A similar story is told by the ECA whose audits highlight a continuous compliance deficit in 
Cohesion spending reflected in an error rate consistently above the threshold required for 
granting assurance on the regularity of spending.2 Member State supervision and control 
systems were rated as ineffective or partially effective throughout the 2000s, albeit 
witnessing overall improvements in the reports from 2009 onwards.  
 
In both Commission and ECA reports, the key shortcoming in control systems was judged to 
be insufficient and inadequate management verification of projects. Less frequently 
reported problems were a lack of segregation of management and control tasks and 
inadequate reporting of financial corrections. Non-compliance was most frequently 
associated with breaches of rules on eligible expenditure and public procurement. Eligibility 
errors included declaration of costs that were outside the eligible area and period or which 
were not reimbursable, incorrect co-financing rates and lack of supporting evidence for 
claimed costs. The most problematic public procurement issues were non-respect of the 
                                                        
1 The 2002-2012 reports were analysed because the first audits of the 2000-2006 programmes began in 2002 and 
continued until 2012 for programme closure.  
2 The error rate must be below 2% to be classified as free from material error.  
transparency/non-discrimination principle, irregular complementary works, illegal selection 
criteria and problems in tender evaluation.   
 
EXPLAINING FINANCIAL COMPLIANCE 
Quantitative analysis of financial compliance determinants 
What explains the patterns of compliance? We turn now to the statistical analysis of the 
theoretical hypotheses for non-compliance across the EU25 Member States. The financial 
corrections rate is the dependent variable, and the explanatory variables measure 
administrative capacity, regional autonomy, and goodness-of-fit. As the outcome variable 
(financial corrections rate) is bounded at both ends (by 0 and 100 percent), standard OLS 
regression is not an appropriate estimation modelling method because it does not account 
for the fact that percentages are bounded leading to biased and inefficient results. The most 
appropriate estimation method is Beta regression because it models the distribution of the 
dependent variable using the beta distribution, which is bounded between 0 and 100 or 0 
and 1 when transformed to a proportion (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004; Cribari-Neto and 
Zeileis, 2010). Beta regression also benefits from the flexibility of accommodating non-
constant variances and skewness, which are prevalent in bounded outcome variables. 
 
The results of the Beta regression estimations are presented below (Table 4). The regional 
autonomy and regional programming variables were modelled separately because they are 
highly correlated (0.7). A dummy variable is included to control for the stronger compliance 
pressure in the EU10 upon accession (Bachtler et al. 2014). 
 
[Table 4] 
 
The key finding is that administrative capacity is the only statistically significant predictor of 
non-compliance across all models. For the regional autonomy and programming variables, 
the direction of the association is positive in line with hypothesis 1a/2a, but the relationship 
is not significant.  Similarly, the association between non-compliance with goodness-of-fit is 
in the expected direction (negative) but is not statistically significant. By contrast, 
government effectiveness is statistically significant (at the 0.1 percent level) in both models 
and the sign of the association is in the expected direction (negative).   
 
AŶŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵŽĚĞů ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚone of the cases (Italy) has a high level of 
influence on the model distorting its accuracy (reflected in a very high value of ŽŽŬ ?Ɛ
distance). Accordingly, the models were rerun without Italy (in Models 3 and 4). When Italy 
is excluded, administrative capacity remains a significant predictor (at the same 1 percent 
level) but, unlike the previous models, the goodness-of-fit variable acquires significance (at 
the 5 percent level).  
 
Models 1 and 3 were also rerun to distinguish between the two key components of the 
ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů ƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ /ŶĚĞǆ P  ‘ƐĞůĨ-ƌƵůĞ ?  ?ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚ ďǇ Ă ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚŽƐĞ
ǁŚŽ ůŝǀĞ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚƌƵůĞ ?  ?ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚďǇƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ŝŶ
the country as a whole). The results did not change the substantive findings compared to the 
overall RAI, apart from increasing the statistical significance of the goodness-of-fit variable 
(from the 5% to the 1% level) when using the  ‘self-rule ? component of the RAI. 
 
Summing up, the analysis provides strong support for the impact of administrative capacity 
on the financial compliance performance of EU Member States confirming hypothesis 3, as 
well as support for the role of goodness-of-fit in line with hypothesis 4. Contrary to 
expectations, explanations of non-compliance stressing the role of regional autonomy are 
not supported by this analysis, allowing the rejection of the remaining hypotheses (1a/b and 
2a/b).   
 Qualitative analysis of financial compliance determinants 
Further insights on what determines financial compliance across the Member States are 
available from the meta-analysis of the audit findings in the Commission Annual Activity 
Reports (AARs) and ECA audit reports and interviews with informants drawn from national 
government authorities in six Member States and in Commission audit services.  
 
The audit reports and interview research support the finding that weaknesses in 
administrative capacity are a key source of non-compliance in areas such as public 
procurement, eligible expenditure and State aids. Successive AARs concluded that there was 
a lack of assurance that the Member States scrutinized for audit had put in place all the  “key 
elements of appropriate management and control systems which ensure the legality and 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? (European Commission 2002: 50; 2003:48; 2005:53; 
2006:47), or there were reservations associated with  “ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?  ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Commission 2007:74; 2009:97; 2010:57) ĂŶĚ  “ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?  ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ Žŵŵission 
2011:86).  A similar critique of serious system weaknesses is contained in the annual ECA 
reports. For example, the ECA (2003 P  ? ? ? ? ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ ?d ?he management and control 
systems examined do not all yet satisfy the regulatory requirements, although the 
programming period  ? ? ? ? ƚŽ  ? ? ? ? ŝƐ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ŝŶƚŽ ŝƚƐ ĨŽƵƌƚŚ ǇĞĂƌ ŽĨ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? These 
problems persisted in subsequent years (ECA 2004; 2005; 2006), with the 2006 ECA report 
noting that Member State control systems were generally ineffective or only moderately 
effective (ECA 2007:  152). 
 
In the course of the 2000s, the Commission AARs increasingly identified specific aspects of 
administrative capacity as weak (shortage of administrative personnel, high staff turnover, 
lack of political steer, organisational complexity, lack of control), and the need for capacity-
building measures feature strongly in the ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛrequired corrective measures 
(European Commission 2007; 2009; 2011; 2012).  ECA reports also refer to incomplete audit 
trails, lack of manuals, inadequate organisation of controls and insufficient independence of 
audit functions (ECA 2003; ECA 2004; 2005). 
 
Some reports highlight the competing demands of financial absorption and compliance, as 
the need to spend the funds in a timely manner risked detracting from compliance (ECA 
2006: 59; ECA 2008: 71). The ECA warned of ineligible expenditure being claimed to avoid 
decommitment ?ƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚďǇŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇǀĞƌŝĨŝĞĚŶĞǁĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ?Žƌ ‘ƉĂƌŬĞĚ ?ŝŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
engineering instruments, particularly as the eligibility period for 2000-06 came to an end in 
2009 (ECA 2010: 99; ECA 2011: 113; ECA 2012: 97). 
 
The interview research also found that the capacity effect differs between Member States. 
Among the countries with the highest number of corrections during the 2000-06 period 
(Ireland, Greece, Spain), the capacity problems were particularly acute at the national level. 
In Greece , they required the creation of a special technical management unit (MOU) outside 
the ministerial structure  W whereas in Ireland and Spain, the capacity deficits were identified 
at a lower level among the large number of implementing bodies (agencies etc.) which were 
judged to be less knowledgeable in important procedural areas like public procurement and 
State aids (EC interviews 1 and 2). In the case of Spain, evidence from interviewees and 
implementation reports show that misfit between EU rules and domestic legislation on 
public procurement was one of the main reasons for the high level of financial corrections 
(EC interview 1), particularly the common practice in Spain of making modifications to 
contracted works or awarding additional complementary works during the course of 
implementation. ŶŶƵĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽů ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐZ&&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŽŶƚƌŽůhŶŝƚ
also show that non-compliance with EU public procurement rules have accounted for a 
major share of irregularities in 2000-2006 (e.g. FCU 2007).  
 
By contrast, regional autonomy rarely featured as explanations of non-compliance in the 
audit reports (Tables 2 and 3).  The ECA reports do note that some characteristics of 
regionalisation - larger numbers of programmes, managing authorities and implementing 
bodies, and greater diversity of interventions - presented  ‘ƌŝƐŬƐ ? ĨŽƌ ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐ ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ 
(e.g. ECA 2003). The multi-level governance model of shared management means that many 
actors are involved in policy implementation and may lack awareness or sufficient 
understanding of compliance rules.  However, there is no direct evidence of regionalisation 
per se accounting for greater compliance problems. The substantive audit findings or 
recommendations do not identify or imply a causal link between compliance and 
decentralization in political or policy systems.  
 
This was confirmed in the interview research, where informants noted that pressure for 
sound financial management is applied equally to managing authorities and implementing 
bodies at both national and regional levels (MS interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, 6). This was particularly 
the case in 2000-06 when, following the resignation of the Santer Commission, a range of 
new EU financial management and control regulations were introduced and applied 
consistently to all types of Cohesion policy programmes, and the Commission and ECA first 
began to publish data on error rates by Member State (Mendez and Bachtler 2011). A caveat 
to this general conclusion is that uniform compliance at sub-national levels depends on 
strong central coordinating institutions; where these are absent there is a greater risk of 
politicization of Cohesion policy spending and non-compliance (EC interview 1, MS 
interviews 1,2, 4, 5). Regardless of the extent to which the allocation of funding is politicized, 
there are strong pressures to ensure that the projects selected for EU support comply with 
EU financial rules. There is arguably a loss aversion effect at play in Cohesion policy, a 
financial incentive to comply with EU rules to avoid losing funds irrespective of the level of 
politicization or political decentralization. 
 
Looking beyond the variables used in this study, the documentary and interview research 
identified two other factors that may explain patterns of financial compliance. The first is 
regulatory complexity, both at EU level and in Member State rules. The complexity of EU 
rules is a common pressure felt by all Member States and therefore cannot be directly linked 
to variations in compliance performance, although an interactive effect with capacity is likely 
in that compliance with complex rules would be more challenging for countries with weak 
administrative capacity. In terms of domestic rules, the compounding effect of setting 
additional rules that go beyond EU requirements -  a practice termed  ‘ŐŽůĚ-ƉůĂƚŝŶŐ ? (e.g. 
Nyikos and Tatrai 2015) - on complexity is recognized to be a problem that varies across 
countries, but there are no available data measuring the extent of this across countries to 
permit a systematic analysis of the effects (SWECO 2013).  Interviewees also identified the 
potential conflict between different regulatory requirements, noting that there are 
administrative trade-offs in ensuring financial compliance as well as complying with an 
increasingly complex set of rules on timely, efficient, thematically focused and effective 
spending (EC interview 2, reinforcing the conclusions of Bachtler and Ferry 2013). 
 
A second additional factor relates to control mechanisms. The ECA argues that the control 
bodies in many Member States do not enforce EU rules effectively and has called for stricter 
oversight by the Commission over national bodies, particularly in terms of public 
procurement and the enforcement of sanctions. It also criticizes the limited use of audit 
findings and weak feedback mechanisms between audit, control and management bodies 
(ECA 2004, 2005). 
 As noted above, there are several layers of financial management and control, but the 
monitoring of financial compliance by Member States authorities varies significantly across 
the EU. Interview research revealed Commission concern about the independence of 
national/regional audit authorities which may underplay the level of financial irregularities in 
some countries. KŶĞ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĂƵĚŝƚ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ŝƐ
questionable in certain countries or regions, especially where management and audit 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?  ?EC interview 2). Thus, a low level of financial 
corrections may in fact indicate poorly performing audit functions rather than compliant 
implementation. 
 
Nevertheless, all Member States have been forced to adopt stricter approaches to 
compliance monitoring and assurance driven to a large extent by stricter supervisory 
pressure from the Commission since the mid-2000s, including the issuing of reservations on 
programmes, remedial actions plans and suspensions and interruptions of payments (Table 
2). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
EU compliance research has expanded over the last decade but has paid little attention to 
the financial dimension of compliance in terms of infringements of EU rules on the regularity 
and legality of EU expenditure, despite the increasing salience for EU policymakers and in 
the media. In advancing a more multidimensional approach to compliance research, this 
article has undertaken an innovative analysis of financial compliance patterns and 
determinants across EU countries using the case study of Cohesion policy to facilitate a new 
research agenda. The findings have wider implications for compliance research and policy 
practice.   
 
The article provides strong arguments for the adoption of a broader conceptualization of 
compliance to cover the financial dimension. The analysis has revealed distinctive cross-
national compliance patterns that differ from those identified in studies of EU Directives. 
The evidence from the Cohesion policy case challenges the categorization of the new 
DĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƐĂ “ǁŽƌůĚ ŽĨĚĞĂĚůĞƚƚĞƌƐ ? ?&ĂůŬŶĞƌĂŶĚdƌŝĞď ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶĐŽŵƉůǇŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ h
(financial) legal obligations (see also Bachtler et al. 2013; Tosun 2014).  Similarly, the weak 
compliance performance of Ireland (and Spain in 2000-06) in Cohesion policy contrasts with 
their strong performance in the transposition of EU Directives. The implication is that 
differences in compliance dimensions and policy types matter in explaining outcomes and 
should be factored into any comprehensive conceptualization or assessment of EU 
compliance.  
 
However, the research provides mixed support for explanatory conclusions in the EU 
compliance literature. On the one hand, explanations of compliance stressing the role of 
political decentralization are not supported in the case of EU Cohesion policy. This is 
surprising because the ERDF is arguably the most decentralized EU policy instrument, 
representing an easy test for theories stressing the role of veto points as obstacles to 
compliance. The question arises as to why political decentralization does not impact on 
compliance. The most plausible explanation from the research is the different incentive 
structure of this budgetary policy domain. Cohesion policy is a redistributive policy that 
provides EU funding to national, regional and local governments for public investment, while 
regulatory policies tend to impose financial costs on different levels of government.  There is 
arguably a loss aversion effect at play in Cohesion policy, a political pressure and financial 
incentive to comply with EU rules to avoid losing funds irrespective of the level of political 
decentralization.  This reinforces the need for a broader conceptualization of compliance 
covering different policy types and compliance dimensions to further understanding of 
compliance variations across the EU. 
 
On the other hand, this study adds support to institutional explanations of EU compliance 
stressing the positive role of administrative capacity and goodness-of-fit in compliance 
(Angelova et al. 2012). The review of Commission and ECA policy reports showed that 
weaknesses in different aspects of administrative capacity were factors explaining financial 
non-compliance. Future studies on Cohesion policy compliance in more recent periods 
(2007-13 and beyond) could extend these findings to include the accession of Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia, all of which have relatively weak administrative capacity. The much 
larger volumes of funding allocated to the EU10 across a wider range of thematic priorities 
in 2007-13, and greater regionalization of resource allocation in some countries may change 
the compliance picture in Central and Eastern Europe  W although the provisional data for 
2007-13 show similar differences between the EU15 and EU10. It is also possible that the 
stricter compliance regime introduced in 2006 (for the 2007-13 period) and continued under 
the 2013 reform (for the 2014-20 period) and enforcement of punitive measures by the 
Commission may lead to an overall improvement in compliance and convergence across 
countries.  Further analysis of differences in the institutional independence of national audit 
authorities/functions and the effects on compliance are also worth exploring.  
 
An important finding is the way that Cohesion policy is being used as a boundary-spanning 
tool for enforcing Member State compliance in other EU policies.  The cross-cutting 
enforcement role of Cohesion policy remains unexamined in the literature, but may explain 
some of the unexplained variations in compliance in other regulatory policies (such as Public 
Procurement and Environmental Directives), given the differential scrutiny and oversight 
pressures emanating from Cohesion policy across countries and regions.  
 
The boundary-spanning enforcement role of Cohesion policy has been strengthened under 
the 2013 reform in regulatory and macro-economic areas. New ex-ante conditionality 
provisions require compliance with EU Directives linked to Cohesion policy investments 
before programmes are approved or agreement on a compliance action plan with periodic 
monitoring and the possibility of sanctions. Implementing these provisions has been 
challenging, requiring the adoption of many actions plans to ensure compliance with EU 
Directives, notably on energy efficiency, environmental impact assessment and public 
procurement (European Commission 2014). Macro-economic conditionality has also been 
strengthened, providing for suspensions of Cohesion policy funding and revisions to 
programmes when EU economic governance rules are breached, namely the Stability and 
Growth Pact/Excessive Deficit Procedure, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, and 
the economic adjustment programmes for some Member States. The impact of ex-ante and 
macro-economic conditionality on state behaviour and the interactions with compliance 
dynamics and outcomes merits scrutiny in future studies. 
 
Turning to the policy implications, the main lesson is the need to strengthen administrative 
capacity to improve compliance performance. EU policymakers have recognized this in 
recent years, reflected in ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă ŶĞǁ ƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ  ‘ĞŶŚĂŶcing the 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĨŽƌ  ? ? ? ?-20 and the creation of 
administrative capacity units in the Commission to support capacity-building in the Member 
States. However, it is not clear what impact this will have in practice given the culture of 
mistrust and fear of financial corrections that has been fostered by the explosion in 
Cohesion policy audit activity (Mendez and Bachtler 2011). Further, administrative capacity 
is a wide-ranging term encompassing structures, systems and resources, and the 
relationship with implementation performance is far from clear. 
 
As capacity deficiencies are likely to be compounded in a complex regulatory environment, a 
further policy implication is the need to reduce regulatory complexity, including 
harmonization of rules across EU policies/funds and the minimization of  ‘gold-plating ? of EU 
rules with additional domestic legislation. This is easier said than done. Simplification has 
been pursued in the 2006 and 2013 reforms, yet both reforms also introduced new 
compliance requirements (and numerous Delegated and Implementing Acts for 2014-20) 
that have increased the regulatory complexity of implementation to the extent that (under 
Member State pressure) the Commission has been forced to set up a high-level review group 
chaired by a former EU Commissioner to re-assess the scope for regulatory and 
administrative simplification in Cohesion policy. 
 
Finally, there are several avenues to develop the robustness and generalizability of the 
findings. Future studies should go beyond the analysis of national indicators because there 
are significant regional/programme-level variations in compliance measures and in 
explanatory variables such as administrative capacity. Another route is qualitative analysis of 
individual cases, comparing our findings with in-depth studies of specific countries, regions 
or programmes. Studies could compare compliance under the ERDF with other EU Funds and 
policies to deepen our understanding of financial compliance dynamics in the EU.  
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Table 1: Financial corrections in the 2000-06 programmes  
Member State (EU-15) ERDF 
Contribution 
 ? ?ŵŝůů ? 
Financial 
corrections 
 ? ?ŵŝůů ? 
Financial corrections 
(%  of contribution) 
 
Member State (EU-10) ERDF 
Contribution 
 ? ?ŵŝůů ? 
Financial 
corrections 
 ? ?ŵŝůů ? 
Financial corrections 
(%  of contribution) 
 
Austria 893.7 19.8 2.22 Cyprus 28.0 0.02 0.06 
Belgium 865.3 15.6 1.8 Czech Republic 985.6 26.8 2.72 
Denmark 15574.6 299.6 1.92 Estonia 232.8 1.0 0.44 
Finland 147.0 1.1 0.23 Hungary 1239.4 4.2 0.34 
France 28019.0 2700.1 1.66 Lithuania 583.9 2.7 0.46 
Germany 916.2 2.1 0.77 Latvia 382.0 0.9 0.23 
Greece 8270.0 137.4 10.06 Malta 46.7 1.1 2.28 
Ireland 15176.6 1526.1 11.07 Poland 4972.8 128.6 2.59 
Italy 1951.7 216.1 6.39 SIovenia 136.5 1.5 1.12 
Luxembourg 18753.2 1197.4 3.97 Slovak Republic   4.75 
Netherlands 44.0 1.7 2.35     
Portugal 970.9 22.8 3.36     
Spain 13249.3 445.6 9.64     
Sweden 880.8 41.9 0.36     
United Kingdom 8990.5 266.8 2.97     
        
EU-15 average 114702.7 6894.1 5.99 EU-10 average 880.8 41.9 2.20 
Source: European Commission (2013) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Synthesis of ECA audits of the 2000-06 ERDF programmes 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Key inherent risks             
Complexity of rules, including other EU policies    x x    x x x x 
Shared management involving many levels/bodies   x x x    x x x x 
Competing management demands esp. financial absorption        x  x x 
Regularity of payments            
Materiality compliance (error rate < 5%) N N N N N N N N N N N 
Most likely error rate na na na na 12%** 12%** 11%** 3%** 7.7% 6% 6.8% 
Frequency of ERDF errors na na na na 45% 36% 51% 40% 53% 41% 46% 
Types of errors             
Occurrence x x x x        
Eligibility x x x x x x x x  x x 
Accuracy x  x x  x x x  x  
Key errors            
Incorrect grant rates  x x x x x      x 
Ineligible costs  x x x x x x x x x x x 
Public procurement breaches   x x x x x x x x x 
Failure to account for generation of revenue   x x      x  x 
State aid breaches   x x     x  x 
MS supervision and control systems             
Mainly ineffective      x       
Mainly ineffective or partially effective x x x x  x      
Mainly effective, some partially effective       x x x x x 
Recommendations            
Training and guidance for project promoters     x x      
Training and guidance for managing authorities      x x    x x 
Targeted guidance  W eligibility and public procurement       x    x 
EC oversight  W Member State managing/audit authorities x x  x x x x    x 
EC oversight  W public procurement        x x x  
EC oversight  W sanctions enforcement  x  x   x x x x  
EC/MS feedback mechanisms and use of audit findings      x x  x  x  
Simplify procedures to reduce complexity     x x     x 
Notes: * The payment audits during 2010-12 accounted for 10-15% of the total payments audited as the audits focused mainly on the 2007-13 programmes. The final systems audits of were 
undertaken in 2009 (recoveries/withdrawals) and 2011 (closure systems), but focussed on the 2007-13 programmes in 2010 and 2012. ** Minimum error estimates 
Source: Own elaboration based on textual analysis of ECA Annual Reports (for financial years 2002-12).  
Table 3: Synthesis of Commission audits of the 2000-06 ERDF programmes  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Key inherent risks            
Large number of organisations/beneficiaries     x x x x x x  
Many different types of projects and programmes  x   x x x x x x  
Complex eligibility rules at Community/national level  x   x x      
Multi-annual framework affects design/control systems     x x      
Administrative capacity  x          
Assessment of control systems (No. OPs/% total payments)*            
Reasonable (works well)   x x x     x 124/35% 147/28% 157/28% 208/29% 212/13% 269 317 
Qualified moderate (works, but needs improvement) 
x x x 
x 152/40% 50/11% 133/33% 143/58% 146/52% 80 53 
Qualified significant (works, but needs significant improvement) x  139/48% 73/35% 24/13% 21/35% 27 3 
Adverse (does not work)     23/5% 43/13% 16/5% 4/0.5 0/0% 2 6 
Key deficiencies            
Insufficient or inadequate management checks by MAs x x x x x x x x x X  
Lack of separation of functions     x x      
Public procurement  x   x x x x x x   
Lack of evidence of financial corrections          X x 
Actions taken            
Actions Plans  x x x x x x x x X  
Payment interruptions, suspensions or corrections   x x x x x x x X x 
Reservations x x x x x x x x x X x 
Contracts of confidence   x x x  x x    
Guidance  W controls     x  x     
Guidance  W revenue generating projects        x    
Seminars and/or guidance  W assurance, closure, procurement  x   x x  x  x x  
Simplification of rules   x x x x  x x    
Notes: dŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?/Ŷ ? ?-2003, the focus of audit work was on the set-up of control systems (notably desk reviews of the descriptions of systems) 
rather than implementation. By 2004, assurance had not yet been granted for the set-up of systems in 2 Member States (Portugal, Greece).  
Source:  Own elaboration based on textual analysis of Commission Annual Activity Reports (for financial years 2002-2012). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Explaining non-compliance in EU Cohesion policy: Beta Regression results  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(excl. IT) 
Model 4 
(excl. IT) 
 B (SE) CIs B (SE) CIs B (SE) CIs B (SE) CIs 
Regional 
autonomy  
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05 0.02    -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.05 0.01    
Regional 
programming 
   -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 0.00    -0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.01 0.00 
Administrative  
Capacity 
-1.25*** 
(0.36) 
-1.85 -0.65 -1.21*** 
(0.62) 
-1.63 -0.62 -2.46*** 
(0.51) 
-3.00 -1.62 -2.25*** 
(0.47) 
-3.02 -1.47 
Goodness-of fit 
(policy) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 0.01 -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 0.01 -0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.05 -0.01 -0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.05 -0.00 
Control: NMS 
 
-1.63*** 
(0.41) 
-2.30 -0.95 -1.77*** 
(0.39) 
-2.42 -1.12 -2.36 *** 
(0.41) 
-3.04 -1.68 -2.40*** 
(0.39) 
-3.04 -1.75 
Intercept -1.17 
(0.81) 
-2.50 0.17 -1.21* 
(0.62) 
-2.22 -0.20 1.10 
(1.01) 
-0.56 2.76 0.84 
(0.88) 
-0.61 2.29 
Phi 62.88** 
(19.17) 
65.52** 
(19.95) 
86.26** 
(26.58) 
88.03** 
(27.07) 
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.51 
N 25 25 24 24 
Notes: Beta regression (precision model with identity link). Confidence intervals at lower and upper levels. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Significance codes:  '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 
